Servers, proxies and network services

nginx security releases

nginx2root: HTTP/2, HTTP/3, resolver and mail-proxy flaws

nginx 1.30.7 (stable) and 1.31.9 (mainline), released 18 November 2026, fix five flaws F5 and nginx both rate 9.2 (CVSS 4.0) critical. Two were independently found by five separate teams: Wiz Research, Xint, Metnir, Rapid7 and Ikotas Labs, who also call it NGINX2Shell (the same two bugs, not a sixth): CVE-2026-123007, an HTTP/2 flow-control integer underflow exploitable even on a plain static-file server with no backend, and CVE-2026-123633, a use-after-free reachable when HTTP/2 is proxied to an upstream and the worker is short of connection slots. Xint found three more on its own as part of research it names nginx2root: CVE-2026-123634 (a resolver use-after-free, reachable through mirror plus a request-derived proxy_pass target), CVE-2026-121810 (the same shape of bug over HTTP/3 instead of HTTP/2), and CVE-2026-113425 (a use-after-free in the mail proxy's auth_http path). Xint also chained CVE-2026-123007 with an undisclosed, unpatched, not-yet-numbered Linux kernel SCTP use-after-free to get root on the host, including out of a Docker container; that kernel bug is a different, newer issue from three already-fixed 2026 SCTP flaws in the kernel's own advisory history, one of them nicknamed "SCTPhantom", and this script cannot check for it, only help block the module that carries it.

CVE-2026-123007 affects nginx 1.9.5 through 1.31.8 and needs nothing but HTTP/2 turned on; it was present in every official release for more than a decade. The other four each need a more specific setup:

CVE Needs, besides an unpatched version First affected http2/http3 off helps?
CVE-2026-123007 HTTP/2 on, nothing else 1.9.5 yes
CVE-2026-123633 HTTP/2 on, proxied to an upstream 1.19.7 yes
CVE-2026-123634 resolver, a request-derived proxy_pass, and mirror 0.6.18 no
CVE-2026-121810 HTTP/3 (quic) on, proxied to an upstream 1.25.0 no (http3 off helps)
CVE-2026-113425 a mail block with proxy on and auth_http 0.5.33 no

Rapid7 published a working proof of concept; it needs about 128 GB of HTTP/2 traffic over one connection and a glibc memcpy implementation chosen at runtime on CPUs with AVX-512. Xint's own write-up and demo instead walk through a build that resolves to the AVX2 memcpy path. Both are real, CPU-dependent variants of the same bug, not a disagreement between them: glibc picks one of several vectorized memcpy implementations at runtime based on the CPU's feature flags, and the backward-copy quirk both researchers describe exists in more than one of them.

check and hunt change nothing. check reports the nginx version on the host and in containers, and audits the running configuration (nginx -T) for each flaw's trigger directives, the same approach as our October tool below: a match shows the ingredients are present, not a guarantee, and matches are not confirmed to share a server or location block. hunt looks for signs in the logs that match what Xint's own write-up says an attack leaves: sustained one-way traffic, requests that stay small while received bytes climb, and abnormal worker exits. None of it can see the WINDOW_UPDATE and RST_STREAM control frames the attack itself sends: those are not logged requests, and TLS hides them from a packet capture at the host. mitigate edits nginx.conf for three of the five flaws (--http2-off also covers the one chained with the kernel bug), backs up every file it touches, and rolls back automatically if nginx rejects the result. The fourth, the resolver and mirror flaw, needs a fixed upstream address only you know, so rules explains it instead of editing anything. The kernel flaw has its own mitigate --block-sctp option, since it is not an nginx.conf change.

nginx2root quick start

  1. Download the script.

    curl -fLO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PrivacySafe/security-patches/refs/heads/main/nginx/nginx2root-check.sh
    
  2. Read it before running it, then make it executable.

    less nginx2root-check.sh
    chmod +x nginx2root-check.sh
    
  3. See what's exposed. Run as root so nginx -T can read the full config and the package checks work.

    sudo ./nginx2root-check.sh check
    
  4. The single broadest fix, if you can't upgrade yet:

    sudo ./nginx2root-check.sh mitigate --http2-off
    

nginx2root commands

Command What it does
check (default) nginx version on the host and in containers, and a configuration audit for the five flaws' trigger directives. Root optional, but nginx -T usually needs root to read the full config. Exits 0 if nothing is exposed, 1 if a vulnerable nginx is present, 2 if something couldn't be read
hunt Read-only: connection and log signals from Section 3.2 of Xint's write-up (long-lived connections with far more received than sent, HTTP/2 requests whose logged length stays small while bytes climb, and abnormal nginx worker exits). None of this proves an attack on its own. Exits 0 if nothing found, 1 if it found a lead
mitigate --http2-off | --http3-off | --mail-loopback | --block-sctp [--force] [--dry-run] [--reload] Changes the host (root). With no option, applies --http2-off. Every nginx.conf file is copied first and checked with nginx -t before and after; if nginx rejects the result the originals are put back at once. --block-sctp is a /etc/modprobe.d/ drop-in, not an nginx.conf change, and applies regardless of what nginx -T reports
rollback [--dry-run] [--reload] Puts back everything mitigate changed, nginx.conf and the modprobe.d drop-in alike
rules Prints the manual fix for CVE-2026-123634 and the exact modprobe.d line --block-sctp writes, for anyone who would rather add either by hand
version Prints the script version

nginx2root workarounds: mitigate

Option Flaw(s) What it does What it changes
--http2-off CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123633 Sets http2 off; (nginx >= 1.25.1) or drops the http2 listen parameter (older), per F5's own workaround Breaks anything that specifically needs HTTP/2, such as native gRPC
--http3-off CVE-2026-121810 Removes quic listen parameters, sets http3 off;, and replaces (or adds) an Alt-Svc header advertising HTTP/3 with Alt-Svc 'clear' Breaks QUIC/HTTP/3 access; HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 keep working
--mail-loopback CVE-2026-113425 Binds every mail proxy listen directive on a standard mail port to 127.0.0.1 Only this host can reach the mail proxy; remote mail clients lose access. Use a firewall instead, and skip this, if the proxy needs outside access
--block-sctp the undisclosed kernel flaw Adds install sctp /bin/false under /etc/modprobe.d/ modprobe refuses to load the sctp module from then on. Does not unload a copy already loaded (lsmod | grep sctp), and does nothing on a kernel with SCTP compiled in rather than as a module. Skip this on a host that uses SCTP

CVE-2026-123634 is not automated, because the fix needs your own backend address; see rules. After a change, mitigate re-runs the audit and says what is still exposed. STATE_DIR (default /var/lib/psf-security-patches/nginx2root) holds the backups and manifest.

Verified on nginx 1.24 (Ubuntu): the audit reported all of CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123633, CVE-2026-123634 and CVE-2026-113425 against test configurations matching each flaw's trigger directives, and correctly reported CVE-2026-121810 as not configured when no HTTP/3 directive was present. After mitigate --http2-off, nginx -t accepted the result and the re-audit no longer reported either HTTP/2 flaw; rollback restored the file exactly. The same cycle was confirmed for --mail-loopback, including that a mail proxy already bound to loopback alone is correctly reported as not exposed, and a second, public-bound listener added alongside it is correctly caught. --block-sctp was confirmed idempotent (a second run reports the block is already in place) and its rollback removes the file. --http3-off could not be run through a live nginx -t, because this build's nginx has no http_v3_module; its text transformation was instead verified directly, including that it replaces an existing Alt-Svc header's value in place rather than deleting it, and that re-running it a second time (recomputing the same way mitigate does) makes no further change either way.

Before you run it (nginx2root)

  • The fix is to upgrade to 1.30.7 (stable) or 1.31.9 (mainline), or your distribution's backport, then reload. As of 18 November 2026, Debian's and Ubuntu's own security trackers both still marked every supported release vulnerable; no distro had shipped a backport yet.
  • CVE-2026-123007 needs nothing but HTTP/2 turned on, so treat an unpatched version as exposed to it even if you skip or can't run the configuration audit. The other four each need their own directive combination; see the table above.
  • The config audit matches directives across the whole nginx -T output and cannot prove they share one server or location block, so treat an "exposed" line as "review this," not a verdict.
  • mitigate --http2-off and --http3-off break anything that specifically depends on that protocol (native gRPC needs HTTP/2; QUIC-only clients need HTTP/3). --mail-loopback cuts off remote mail clients; use it only if the proxy doesn't need outside access, and prefer a firewall rule otherwise.
  • --block-sctp does nothing for a kernel that already has the module loaded, or one with SCTP compiled in rather than built as a loadable module; check lsmod | grep sctp first, and skip this option entirely on a host that uses SCTP.
  • The kernel flaw itself has no CVE, no patch, and no way for this script to detect it; --block-sctp only reduces exposure to the one chain Xint demonstrated, and does nothing about any other local-privilege-escalation path.
  • GNU/Linux only.

nginx October 2026 Check

Script: nginx/nginx-oct2026-check.sh

nginx 1.30.6 (stable) and 1.31.7 (mainline), released 14 October 2026, fix five flaws. Three are memory bugs in a worker process (a crash, and possibly code execution): CVE-2026-15176 (alias with a rewrite), CVE-2026-93479 (a regex map whose captures are used by root or log_format), and CVE-2026-97205 (aio with SSI). One forges a TLS session that can bypass client-certificate checks (CVE-2026-97629, in the automatic rotation of session-ticket keys). One slips extra bytes into a proxied request (CVE-2026-95101, HTTP/3). The njs JavaScript module separately shipped 1.0.2 with two XML-module fixes (CVE-2026-101019, CVE-2026-101025). nginx rates all five medium. F5 scores the three memory bugs 9.2 (critical), the TLS flaw 8.3, and the HTTP/3 flaw 6.9. None was reported exploited as of mid-October 2026.

Each flaw needs a specific directive, so a vulnerable nginx version is not necessarily reachable. check and hunt change nothing. check reports the nginx and njs versions on the host and in containers, and audits the running configuration with nginx -T for the directive combination each flaw needs, printing F5's workaround for the ones you are exposed to. The fix is to upgrade to 1.30.6 or 1.31.7 (or your distribution's backport) and reload. Nginx publishes fixes for those two branches only, so an older branch such as 1.28 stays in the affected range unless your distribution backported the patches. mitigate applies the three simple workarounds for you, with a backup and an automatic undo; the others need an administrator to read the configuration.

nginx quick start

  1. Download the script. The repository is mirrored on GitHub and Codeberg; pick a base URL.

    # BASE from GitHub:   https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PrivacySafe/security-patches/refs/heads/main
    # BASE from Codeberg: https://codeberg.org/PrivacySafe/security-patches/raw/branch/main
    # curl -fLO "$BASE/nginx/nginx-oct2026-check.sh"
    curl -fLO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PrivacySafe/security-patches/refs/heads/main/nginx/nginx-oct2026-check.sh
    
  2. Read it before running it, then make it executable.

    less nginx-oct2026-check.sh
    chmod +x nginx-oct2026-check.sh
    
  3. See what's exposed. Run as root so nginx -T can read the full config and the package checks work.

    sudo ./nginx-oct2026-check.sh check
    
  4. Look for worker crashes.

    sudo ./nginx-oct2026-check.sh hunt
    

nginx commands

Command What it does
check (default) Reports the nginx and njs versions on the host and in running containers, and audits the running configuration (nginx -T) for the five flaws' trigger directives, printing F5's workaround for each one you are exposed to. Changes nothing, root recommended. Exits 0 if nothing is exposed, 1 if a vulnerable nginx/njs is present, 2 if something couldn't be read
hunt Read-only log triage for nginx worker crashes (workers exited on a crash signal, segfaults, use-after-free/heap aborts), the likely symptom of the memory bugs. Exits 0 if nothing matched, 1 if it found something
mitigate --tickets-off | --aio-off | --proxy-buffering-off [--force] [--dry-run] [--reload] Changes the host (root). Applies three of F5's workarounds, only for flaws the same configuration audit as check reports as exposed (a patched build, or a flaw your configuration cannot reach, is left alone unless you add --force). With no option it applies --tickets-off and --aio-off, the two low-impact measures; --proxy-buffering-off is added on request (see below). Every file is copied first and checked with nginx -t before and after; if nginx rejects the result the originals are put back at once. Reloads nothing unless you add --reload
rollback [--dry-run] [--reload] Puts back every file mitigate changed
version Prints the script version. Every command prints it on its first line too

Commands that change the host need root. Run them with sudo from an admin account, not from a root login, so the change is recorded against a person. The script stops and prints the exact command if you forget:

sudo ./nginx-oct2026-check.sh mitigate --tickets-off --dry-run
sudo ./nginx-oct2026-check.sh mitigate --tickets-off
sudo ./nginx-oct2026-check.sh rollback

nginx patch detection

nginx fixes land on the two current branches only: 1.30.6 (stable) and 1.31.7 (mainline). The script judges a version accordingly. A 1.30.x build is fixed at 1.30.6, a 1.31.x build at 1.31.7, and anything 1.32.0 or newer is fixed. An older branch (1.28 and earlier) upgrades to 1.30.6 or 1.31.7. For an nginx installed from a Debian or Ubuntu package, the package build and changelog are checked first (FIXED_BUILDS plus the changelog naming one of the CVEs), because a distribution can backport the fix while keeping the upstream version number. njs is judged against 1.0.2.

nginx and CVE-2026-42533 (July)

A separate, critical flaw was fixed three months before this release. CVE-2026-42533 is a heap buffer overflow in nginx's script engine, the code that builds strings from variables for set, rewrite, proxy_pass and similar directives (CVSS 4.0 score 9.2). It is reached when a map does regular expression matching and a string expression uses captures that the map changed, or when a non-cacheable variable changes between the length pass and the copy pass of a script. Open source nginx 0.9.6 through 1.30.3 and 1.31.2 are affected, and 1.30.4 (stable) and 1.31.3 (mainline), released on 15 July 2026, fix it. A public proof of concept was reported on 27 July.

This tool does not audit for it by name. Its version bar, 1.30.6 and 1.31.7, is newer than that fix, so an nginx that passes check has it, and a distribution package is judged by its changelog for the October flaws. If you can only apply the July fix, 1.30.4 or 1.31.3, or your distribution's backport, closes that flaw and not the five of October.

A reported regression in the Red Hat family backport. On 4 November a downstream distribution reported that the backport of the CVE-2026-42533 fix in Red Hat family packages makes nginx answer a small share of requests with HTTP 500 and log [alert] ... no buffer space in script copy. It happens on configurations where a set or rewrite uses a variable from a map marked volatile whose value itself contains variables. The report traces it to nested script evaluation overwriting a global buffer end that the backport uses to avoid changing nginx's ABI, and describes the upstream fix as keeping that end per script engine, so only the Red Hat family backport is described as affected. It was reported to Red Hat as RHEL-300689, and Red Hat's packages did not have a fix when it was written. We have not reproduced it.

What to do: keep the CVE-2026-42533 fix, because the flaw is critical and reachable without a login. If you see that alert, look for a volatile map used in a set or rewrite. The report notes that a map without volatile is computed once and does not nest, which changes how often the value is recomputed, so check that before you rely on it. check prints an information line, and changes no verdict or exit code, when the running configuration has a volatile map on a Red Hat family host.

nginx configuration audit

The valuable part. Each of the five flaws needs a particular directive combination, so the script runs nginx -T and reports, per flaw, whether your configuration reaches it:

  • CVE-2026-15176: alias with a rewrite and a reference to $request_filename.
  • CVE-2026-93479: a regex map whose captures are read by root or log_format.
  • CVE-2026-97205: aio enabled together with SSI pages.
  • CVE-2026-95101: HTTP/3 (quic) with proxy_request_buffering on (the default).
  • CVE-2026-97629: ssl_session_cache shared without ssl_session_ticket_key (and not ssl_session_tickets off).

For each, it prints F5's workaround. The matches cover the whole dumped config, so check that the directives share a server or location block; the permanent fix is upgrading.

nginx configuration

Variable Default Purpose
NGINX_STABLE_FIXED 1.30.6 First fixed stable release
NGINX_MAINLINE_FIXED 1.31.7 First fixed mainline release
NJS_FIXED 1.0.2 First fixed njs release
FIXED_BUILDS (empty) Distro nginx builds known to carry the backported fix, space-separated full versions
NGINX_T 1 0 skips the nginx -T config audit
SCAN_CONTAINERS 1 0 skips reading nginx inside running containers
HUNT_SINCE 2026-10-01 How far back hunt reads the journal
HUNT_LOGS (empty) Extra log globs for hunt

nginx workarounds: mitigate

Option Flaw What it does What it changes
--tickets-off CVE-2026-97629 Where ssl_session_cache is shared, adds ssl_session_tickets off (an explicit on becomes off) TLS session resumption through the shared cache still works; ticket resumption stops
--aio-off CVE-2026-97205 Replaces aio on and aio threads with aio off Slower file serving under load; nothing breaks
--proxy-buffering-off CVE-2026-95101 Sets proxy_request_buffering off at the http level, or turns an explicit on into off (only when the configuration sets it nowhere else) Request bodies are streamed to the upstream: retries stop, and an upstream that needs Content-Length may fail

CVE-2026-15176 (alias with a rewrite and $request_filename) and CVE-2026-93479 (a regex map whose captures feed root or log_format) are not automated, because they need someone to read the configuration. mitigate prints F5's advice for them when they are exposed. After a change it re-runs the audit and says what is still exposed. STATE_DIR (default /var/lib/psf-security-patches/nginx) holds the backups and manifest. NGINX_BIN, NGINX_MAIN_CONF and NGINX_CONF_FILES point it at a binary, a non-default main file and the files to edit.

Verified on nginx 1.24 serving TLS: the audit reported CVE-2026-97629 and CVE-2026-97205. After mitigate --tickets-off --aio-off and a reload the TLS 1.2 handshake no longer issued a session ticket, pages were served as before and the audit reported nothing exposed. rollback restored the file exactly. A configuration that does not validate is left untouched.

Before you run it

  • Updating for the July flaw, CVE-2026-42533, is covered by this tool's version bar. A Red Hat family build with that fix has a reported regression for configurations that use a volatile map (see the section above); keep the fix.
  • The fix. Upgrade to 1.30.6 or 1.31.7 (or your distribution's backport) and reload. Upgrade njs to 1.0.2. The config audit tells you which workarounds apply in the meantime.
  • A vulnerable version is not always reachable. Each flaw needs its directive, which is why the config audit matters. A build with none of the five directives configured is not a path, though upgrading is still the right move.
  • check reads the configuration with nginx -T, which is nginx's own configuration test. If the configuration does not pass that test, nginx writes the error to its own error log, exactly as it does when you run the command yourself.
  • The config audit matches directives across the whole nginx -T output and cannot prove they share one server or location, so treat an "exposed" line as "review this," not a verdict.
  • nginx -T needs root and a valid config. Without them the audit is skipped and reported as unknown; the version checks still run.
  • Distribution backports read correctly. A package can carry the fix under the old upstream number. Add a known-fixed build to FIXED_BUILDS if its changelog doesn't name a CVE.
  • GNU/Linux only.

Red Hat advisories

Red Hat's advisory list (security advisories released 2026-04-01 to 2026-11-03) names the CVEs below. A Red Hat build is judged by its RPM release, not by the upstream version number, because Red Hat backports fixes: the advisory names the release that fixes it. A CVE with no advisory in the list has none for that period, which is not the same as not affected. The current state is on Red Hat's CVE database.

Advisory Released Severity Package and stream CVEs on this page
RHSA-2026:46012 2026-07-26 Important nginx-1.30.4-2.hum1 (Hummingbird) CVE-2026-42533
RHSA-2026:66542 2026-09-11 Important nginx-1.20.1-28.el9_8.6 (RHEL 9.8) CVE-2026-42533
RHSA-2026:67283 2026-09-14 Moderate nginx-1.26.3-9.module+el9.8.0+24845+a897661e.4 (RHEL 9.8) CVE-2026-42533
RHSA-2026:67308 2026-09-14 Moderate nginx-1.24.0-7.module+el9.8.0+24846+e7eec568.5 (RHEL 9.8) CVE-2026-42533
RHSA-2026:67314 2026-09-14 Important nginx-1.26.3-6.el10_2.7 (RHEL 10.2) CVE-2026-42533
RHSA-2026:67315 2026-09-14 Moderate nginx-1.24.0-3.module+el8.10.0+24848+0300f002.5 (RHEL 8.10) CVE-2026-42533
RHSA-2026:79357 2026-10-08 Important costmanagement/costmanagement-ui-rhel10 (container image) CVE-2026-42533
RHSA-2026:83427 2026-10-15 Important nginx-1.30.6-1.hum1 (Hummingbird) CVE-2026-15176, CVE-2026-95101, CVE-2026-97205, CVE-2026-97629
RHSA-2026:93467 2026-11-02 Important nginx-1.20.1-22.el9_6.7 (RHEL 9.6) CVE-2026-42533
RHSA-2026:93468 2026-11-02 Important nginx-1.20.1-16.el9_4.7 (RHEL 9.4) CVE-2026-42533
RHSA-2026:93472 2026-11-02 Important nginx-1.20.1-14.el9_2.7 (RHEL 9.2) CVE-2026-42533

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